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Abstract 
Despite a shared understanding across the EU that access to firearms by the general public 
should be restricted, detailed legislation regarding the ownership, use and trade of firearms 
varies between EU member states. It is unclear however, how such variations impact on the 
policing of gun enabled crime. By using qualitative data generated from interviews with 
police, policy and decision makers from thirteen European countries, the authors of this 
article aim to determine how stakeholders perceive that national variations in firearms 
legislation impact on the policing of gun enabled crime within and across EU countries. Four 
main themes were identified from the qualitative data: disparities in Legislation, disparities in 
Priority given and the Resources allocated to investigations into gun enabled crime as well as 
Interventions. Due to the aforementioned disparities, cross-national investigations into 
incidents of gun crime are at risk of remaining impaired in their effectiveness. Therefore, 
more legislative coherency as well as sustainable long-term interventions will be needed to 
successfully reduce ownership and use of firearms in the criminal world. In this context, a 
departure from an exclusive use of an economic model of gun crime is recommended to 
allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of the black gun market. 
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Introduction 
Historically, guns have always had a legal place in society and have been available to groups 
such as hunters, sport shooters, collectors or arms dealers. Furthermore, firearms are a 
commodity of monetary value and are bought and sold on the European and global market; 
the global arms trade has been estimated to amount to USD 100 billion a year (Amnesty 
International, 2015). If handled and stored responsibly firearms do not necessarily pose an 
immediate threat to public safety. If, however, used inappropriately, firearms can have wide-
ranging social and economic costs. It is estimated that globally in the period 2007-12 
approximately 508,000 people have died as a result of violence with a firearm. Excluding 
victims of legal intervention and armed conflicts, the majority (n=419,000) have fallen victim 
to intentional or unintentional homicides (Small Arms Survey (SAS), 2015a). In addition to 
the human and social costs, the global, economic impact of non-conflict armed violence in 
terms of lost productivity is estimated to be as high as USD 163.3 billion, or 0.14 per cent of 
the annual global Gross Domestic Product (SAS, 2016). 
Although Western-Europe has one of the lowest Gun Enabled Crime (GEC) rates in the 
world (UNODC, 2014) the number of illegally held firearms in the European Union (EU) is 
estimated to be up to 67 million (Duquet and Van Alstein, 2015). Illegal firearms are often 
used in organised crime activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, money laundering 
and gang related violence (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone, 2006; Robert and Innes, 2009; 
Squires, Grimshaw and Solomon 2008). In this context, the use of firearms poses a 
significant de-stabilizing factor in European societies. It is estimated that illicit trafficking has 
been directly responsible for at least 10,000-15,000 firearms related deaths in EU member 
states over the past decade, (UNODC, 2014).  
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Getting a clear comparative picture of the prevalence of GEC is, however, difficult as 
statistical definitions and counting rules vary across countries. Often the definition of GEC; 
such as ‘firearm shot’, ‘used as a blunt weapon’, ‘used as a threat’, ‘firearm carried’ or 
‘firearm ready to hand even if not carried’; do not translate into police statistics. Instead, 
incidents of GEC may be summarized into ‘blocks of crimes’; such as violent crimes, 
robberies, domestic violence etc.; that do not allow detailed analyses of the social, cultural or 
situational contexts in which offences may have occurred.  
In this context, national statistics on gun homicides provide the best data that allow for cross-
national comparisons. Duquet and Van Alstein (2015) state that the European countries with 
the highest rates of gun homicide in the total numbers of homicides are Montenegro (93%), 
Cyprus (63%), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (50%), Italy (45%) and Ireland 
(42%). In the same study it is revealed that countries with the lowest firearm homicide rates 
per 100,000 inhabitants are Iceland (0%), Luxembourg (0%), Malta (0%), the United 
Kingdom (0.04%), Poland (0.05%), Slovenia (0.05%), Austria (0.06%), Denmark (0.06%) 
and Germany (0.07%).  
Unlike US law, within the EU, a shared understanding exists whereby possession and use of 
firearms should be limited to state authorities and access to firearms by the general public 
should be restricted (EU Firearms Directive 91/477/EEC, UN Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition 
2001). There are, however, significant variations across EU member states as to how legal 
gun ownership, use and trade are regulated in detail. 
The focus of legislation across EU member states reflects the original 1991 EU Firearms 
Directive and the subsequent 2005 United Nations Firearms Protocol (UNFP), and 2008 
revised EU Directive. These tools themselves do not define the illegal use of firearms, nor do 
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they define ‘gun enabled crime’ per se but instead focus on defining the mechanisms of 
controlling the legal acquisition and possession of firearms. The issue of determining 
appropriate penalties for contravening the conditions specified by the Directorate was 
devolved down to each country’s judiciary, with the result that each country could determine 
appropriate penalties in line with their individual legal frameworks. 
Full coherence, however, could not be established as imprecise terminology was used 
regarding hunting weapons (Spapens, 2007). Moreover, the directive did not provide a 
universal definition of antique weapons, leaving loopholes that potentially enable the illegal 
acquisition and trafficking of such firearms across EU member states (Diquet and van Alsten, 
2015). The 2005 UNFP merely defined a firearm as ‘any portable barrelled weapon that 
expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile 
by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas’, and the 2008 
Amendments to the EU Directive adopted this definition, and maintained the exception 
clauses identified previously. The 2005 UNFP identified that antique firearms and their 
replicas should be defined in accordance with domestic laws, but that any weapon 
manufactured in 1899 or earlier shall be identified as an antique and therefore not as a 
firearm. 
  INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
Allowing EU member states to impose stricter rules regarding firearm deactivation standards, 
further weakened the directive. Finally, the Directive 2008/51/EC failed to provide a 
universal approach to the trading of gas and alarm weapons despite their frequent use by 
criminals, as they can be relatively easily converted into lethal firearms (Diquet and van 
Alsten, 2015). As specific requirements for obtaining and using firearms in EU member 
states have been discussed elsewhere (Levush, 2013), table 2 outlines some of the major 
6 
 
differences in firearms legislation with regards to access to different types of firearms across 
the EU. 
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
In their fight against GEC, researchers and policy makers alike have often commonly used an 
economic model of gun crime, which highlights the ability of firearms to take or protect 
human life, their use to threaten, intimidate or defend (cf. McDonald, 1999). In this context, 
advocates of stricter regulation have reported a strong positive relationship between gun 
availability and gun violence and emphasized the great financial and physical harm caused by 
gun violence (e.g. Bangalore and Messerli, 2013; Kendall, 1996; Monuteaux et al., 2015; 
Palen, 2001). Opponents, on the contrary, have documented a negative relationship between 
gun availability and crime or no causation at all, stressing that the social costs caused by gun 
violence would be even higher if potential victims would not be allowed to defend 
themselves (e.g. Kleck, 2009; Moody and Marvell, 2005). Although methodological flaws 
impair the conclusiveness of both models (cf. Ayres, 2009; Kleck, 2015; Piquero, 2007; 
Tonso, 2004), both stances have in common a concept of the rationality of social behaviour, 
whereby social action is the result of a conscious actor who reasons about consequential costs 
and benefits of their conduct.  
This has let politicians to predominantly focus on introducing strict legislation, enforced by 
effective policing to deter unauthorized persons from illegally obtaining, trading or using 
firearms. In previous research, two approaches to GEC can be identified, which are both 
based on an economic view of gun crime. On the one hand, attention has predominantly been 
paid to the effect of policy and legislative changes in relation to the complexity of GEC and 
to the police role in dealing with GEC in America  cf.  ndr sa and Hempstead, 2011; 
Lemieux, 2014; Sheptycki and Edwards, 2009; Siegel, Ross and King, 2013). On the other 
hand, previous research has been focusing on comparing GEC in America to Europe, using 
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national statistical data (cf. Brennon and Moore, 2009; Hepburn and Hemenway, 2004; 
Richardson and Hemenway, 2011; Stroebe, 2013). By drawing on unique qualitative data, 
generated in interviews with multiple informants, including high-ranking policy makers and 
members of the police from thirteen EU member states, the authors of this article seek to 
question the economic model of gun crime by focusing on decision-making processes 
regarding the policing of GEC across EU member states.  
In this context, the use of qualitative data taken from interviews conducted across different 
countries within the EU, offers a unique insight into the issues and challenges of combating 
GEC from a European perspective. The authors of this paper envisage that this approach will 
help in shedding light on some of the socio-economic and socio-cultural differences among 
EU member states, and their impact on the policing of GEC across the EU. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
This study draws on qualitative data that were generated in 2015 as part of a project, which 
focussed on identifying the nature, prevalence and impact of GEC within the EU and the 
effectiveness of interventions to combat it. In total, 42 interviews (7 females, 35 males) were 
conducted with representatives from a range of stakeholder groups from 14 countries, that for 
the sake of anonymity will be referred to as ‘police’, ‘policy’ ‘forensics’, ‘statisticians’ and 
‘NGO’s  non-governmental organisations). All participants represented senior figures with 
many years of experience relating to policy development, policing, crime statistics, forensic 
(ballistics) analysis and also included representatives from NGO’s which focused on the 
prevention of gun enabled crime. The distribution of participants by country and gender are 
presented in table 3 below: 
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INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE 
 
Participants were invited to take part in individual interviews to discuss issues concerning 
GEC in their country.  Recruitment was conducted by contacting the organisation directly, 
either through the generic contact details that were publicly available, or direct contact was 
made with a named person provided through a project partner. In all instances institutional 
approval was sought for the research to take place. Once the appropriate participant was 
identified they were provided with an information sheet outlining the nature of the research, 
as well as explaining how data would be used during the analyses and for disseminating 
findings, e.g. publications, presentations.  
In the case of three countries it was not possible to conduct individual interviews; instead 
group interviews were preferred by the stakeholder organisation. In these instances the role of 
each person was clearly identified and the interview schedule for the appropriate stakeholder 
group was used albeit with the person responding in the context of a group. This ensured that 
the same questions were asked across stakeholder groups, regardless of whether the 
interviews were conducted on an individual or group basis. Individual interviews were 
conducted either in person or through Skype. 
All interviews were conducted by an experienced multi-national team of six researchers 
between July and November 2015. Where possible interviews were conducted in English. In 
Germany, France and Belgium interviews were conducted in German and French and 
translated into English word-by-word by the respective interviewers who were native 
speakers of French and German. One interview was conducted via a translator that was 
appointed by the stakeholder’s organisation.  
9 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used enabling participants to make comprehensive 
statements and give explanations at their own pace (Bernard, 2006). In addition, not 
constraining interviewers to a rigorous set of questions allowed exploring new issues as they 
arose during the interview. To assure comparability and reliability of the data generated this 
way, in all interviews, whether individual or group, an interview guide was followed 
(available on request). Interview guides were devised to appeal to the stakeholder 
organisation (i.e. police, ballistic experts) and comprised a set of general questions, with 
more specific questions tailored to the context of the stakeholder group. It was envisaged that 
this approach would help revealing the importance and significance of topics, concerns, and 
meanings as perceived by respondents (Neal, 1995; Rubin and Rubin, 2005).  
Ethics approval was obtained prior to the start of data collection from the University 
Research Ethics Committee. At the start of each interview written consent for each 
participant was obtained. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw their 
participation, to pause at any time if needed, and were also informed of their right to come 
back to questions later in the proceedings, and to not answer questions if they felt unable to. 
All interviews were audio recorded and lasted between 20 and 135 minutes. 
The digital recordings of the interview and focus group sessions were transcribed verbatim 
and the content of the text was coded in relation to the questions in the interview guide. 
Where interviews were conducted through a translator only the answers provided by the 
translator in English were transcribed verbatim. All personal information that explicitly 
identified individuals and organisations was removed from the transcripts.  
All participants were allowed a cooling off period of seven days after the interviews to 
consider whether they wished for their interview to be excluded from the analysis. None of 
the participants did. To avoid publication of sensitive data relating to ongoing operations by 
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law enforcement agencies, research participants were given increased ownership of their 
statements. As part of the consent form, participants could express their wish to view the 
transcribed interviews before the analysis would commence. It was explained to each 
participant that in order to maintain validity of research findings, statements could not be 
altered and would still be included in the analyses. However, participants were given the 
opportunity to mark any statements, which they did not wish to be published. Some 
participants asked that confidential information that they had given remained confidential and 
was not used in the analysis, whilst another requested that a sentence that reflected his 
personal opinion without source or reference was not used. 
Following the guidelines proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006), the data were initially coded 
inductively, that is, adopting a data-driven, bottom-up approach in order to identify all 
possible codes within the corpus of data. Semantic themes were derived by discerning 
commonalities and patterns in the descriptive codes. Some of these semantic themes were 
then developed into latent themes by examining the underlying assumptions and ideologies 
(Braun and Clark 2006: 84) of GEC. The transcripts were coded by the lead author and the 
second author then reviewed the codes and transcripts to determine that the codes were valid 
and that saturation had been reached. Group meetings were held on a weekly basis with the 
remaining authors to discuss and verify the codes that had been identified, and to clarify 
codes when disagreement or ambiguity arose. New codes were generated in order to 
encapsulate the entire dataset.  
Excerpts were selected from the transcripts which provided the clearest support for the 
themes identified and these are presented in the next section. In addition, the themes 
represented are those that are consistent across countries. 
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Results 
Four key themes emerged from the analysis that explained a number of factors that impact on 
the policing of GEC in individual member states and across Europe. These were disparities 
between legislations; disparities in national and international priority given to GEC; a 
disparity in police resources and investigations; and interventions. 
Disparity in legislation 
In the absence of clear EU regulation, many respondents criticised insufficient and 
inconsistent standards regarding the deactivation of firearms in their own or other countries. 
“The fact is that the legislations are not so good in all the countries. In our case in Spain the 
legislation is not very good, is not strong enough in order to avoid this kind of modifications 
of weapons.” 
1MESB 
In some member states deactivation standards were identified as insufficient as they were 
reversible, allowing the creation of a potentially lethal weapon. 
 “In Holland we have standards [that] are used to deactivate weapons and it's done by the 
legal gun dealers, they do that and they give declaration it's deactivated. But if you are a 
technical worker you can bring it back to make it active again.”  
1MNLLE 
The variation in deactivation standards was explained in reference to dissimilar perceptions 
of risk that a deactivated gun may pose. In Sweden, for example, deactivated guns were 
perceived as posing a similar risk to public safety as active firearms and both fell under the 
same licensing laws. 
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 “We do not recognise the legal figure of a deactivated weapon.  Once it has been produced 
as a weapon, as a firearm, it will always be a firearm according to our legislation.”  
2MSELE 
In contrast, in Germany a gun was deemed deactivated if reactivation by a layperson using 
commonly available tools was impossible, and therefore the weapon would no longer pose a 
threat to public safety: 
 “In Germany there are specific standards that have to be met for a gun to be deactivated, 
otherwise it is considered a live gun. And if these standards are met, a gun actually cannot be 
used or reactivated using normal tools.” 
1MFDB 
In other countries, it appeared that deactivation was defined as disabling a gun’s firepower, 
irrespectively of how quickly or easily it could be reactivated. 
“In Slovakia for instance, the big company AFG, they sell Scorpion machine guns and AK-
47s as acoustic weapons. And they just put in a small iron tube or a…, they welded something 
into the barrel, but if you hit it three times with a rod and a hammer, it comes out.  I mean 
you have a functional firearm after 30 minutes of labour.” 
6MBELE 
The impact on the effective policing of GEC, due to the inconsistency of deactivations 
standards, highlights the risk posed and the difficulty in policing across member states with 
different deactivations standards. 
“The issue of the many differences of national regimes to national condition to deactivate 
weapons - this was, I think that was one of the hypotheses for the shooting in Paris, that one 
of the weapons that were used came from Slovakia where it has been deactivated and quite 
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easily reactivated[…].” 
5MBER 
Respondents highlighted difficulties with the implementation of the EU firearms directive 
across EU member states, and emphasised legislative disparities regarding access to guns that 
have been shown to be readily convertible into a firearm capable of discharging a bullet or 
missile. 
“The problem is that you cannot force people in the rest of European countries to stick to the 
rules actually, that’s the problem. Here you're not allowed to have gas alarm weapons, even 
though it's only a gas alarm weapon. You can buy them in Germany but you can’t take them 
to Denmark.”  
1MDKB 
In this context, interviewees highlighted the difficulties in implementing strict legislation due 
to various lobby groups with vested commercial interests in firearms.  
“Some of them are incredibly important historical artifacts that people own and collect and 
there is a massive market. There is a huge market in the UK in deactivated weapons; we 
import tons of weapons and we deactivate them to sell them for all sorts of reasons around 
the world, it's a big import/export issue.” 
4MUKLE 
So at the moment we are currently working on the deactivation standards. […] And 
domestically, obviously we have got quite a vocal stakeholder community who are quite, […] 
yeah but they’re powerful actually, quite influential. […] [T]hey have got, you know, strong 
political allies in, you know like parliament and good representation there. And, they get 
quite a lot of kind of parliamentary time actually.  
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6FUKMIN 
Respondents stressed that the disparity in deactivation standards across EU member states, 
and regarding access to gas, alarm and salute guns, have enabled a grey market to emerge, in 
which firearms are traded across countries with varyingly stringent firearms regulations. 
“Weapons are not classified the same way in different states. […] And member states, they 
are classifying weapons differently among these four categories which is a problem if you 
can buy a weapon without a license in one state and take it to your home country where you 
need a license for it for example. “ 
1MSER 
 “It is also driven by several different laws in Europe. They are very creative in finding all the 
gaps in the laws in the different countries just to create another bunch of firearms which are 
somehow legally made, legally rebuilt and modified and then suddenly they disappear and 
then there are again.”  
2MNLB 
Disparity in Priorities 
Unclear or insufficient terminology of the EU firearms directive was deemed to be 
responsible for inconsistencies in the extent to which GEC was prioritised by police across 
different member states. 
“I mean the interest in EU from Eurostat that we get, it's much more like human trafficking, 
corruption, cybercrime, there the sort of like topics of interest at the moment, rather than 
firearms offences.” 
5MUKSTAT 
The lack or European-wide prioritization was supported in the Netherlands: 
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“In 2012, it [GEC] was not deemed such a threat that it should be prioritised among the 6 
priorities that they (EU commission) would define. 
[…] 
“So there’s no clear agenda with regard to illegal arms trafficking and how to deal with it, 
there’s no overall plan or something.” 
3MNLP 
To some extent, the level of prioritization given to combating GEC reflected socio-cultural 
attitudes towards firearms as highlighted by respondents from Sweden and Serbia.  
“[…] firearms have been seen as a hunting tool by many in Sweden and not seeing this as a 
big social problem that it has become in certain areas.” 
2MSweLE 
“From a technical point of view, there’s a number of issues, the first is that firearms are not 
perceived as a priority because again there’s this issue of (A) on one hand, there’s this for a 
long time exploited fact that firearms are some sort of a cultural heritage.” 
1MSerP 
In general, it appears that prevalence of GEC did not impact on the resources that were 
dedicated to fighting firearm offences. For example, GEC is given high priority in the UK, 
where in proportion to all crimes recorded GEC rates are one of the lowest throughout the 
EU. 
“It is not a low priority for us is it? It is very serious.” 
5MUKSTAT 
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High prioritization of GEC despite its rare occurrence was explained by another respondent 
from the UK with reference to low cultural and social acceptability of firearms.  
“We would put firearms right up here, but why do we do that? Well, we’re unarmed Police 
Service, so actually lots of people going and shooting each other, creates law enforcement 
problems. Culturally we have a very different relationship with firearms, don’t we, to the rest 
of Europe.”  
4MUKLE 
In other countries with more frequent firearm offences, prioritization of GEC varied. 
“It’s very difficult to put firearms here on a very high priority. Every meeting we have about 
this, it’s always a problem. And we all are aware of the situation but if you look at the 
numbers and if you look, actually they are dropping, again.” 
2MNLB 
Many of the responses given indicate that political, cultural and economic factors may have a 
stronger impact on the prioritization to investigate GEC, than its actual prevalence. For 
example respondents from Denmark and Croatia: 
“I think that the unfortunate thing is problem in many countries, that it's difficult to hype 
fighting gun crime; it's easier to hype fighting drugs or illicit trafficking, trafficking human 
beings.”  
3MDKLE 
“It’s very seldom that it’s their [Ministry of interior] top priority. Right now their top priority 
is the refugee crisis. Nobody is talking about gun problems and there are still gun problems, 
there are cases of illegal, of somebody being killed by or wounded by the illegal weapons. 
But this is not a top priority.”  
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1MHRNGO 
However, in countries that have recently experienced internal conflict respondents 
commented that high prioritization was given to combatting GEC: 
 “It has high priority. In the Section for organized crime, there is a section, in the Department 
for Organized Crime there is a section for fight against illegal trade in firearms and 
hazardous materials. This is a big section and it has a high priority.”  
3MMKLE 
Similarly, high-profile incidents in a country, such as amok shootings or terrorist attacks 
resulted in higher prioritization of combating GEC. 
“The issue of firearms was not a priority until after the shooting that occurred in Liege in 
2011; this is because if there is no data, it is not a priority, which then means there are no 
resources or funding to develop and attain resources, which then causes a cycle.” 
2FBELE 
“Swedish government gave a task to police and customs to intensify the combat of the illegal 
flow of firearms into Sweden.  Stemming from mainly a series of public shootings, mainly in 
southern Sweden at that time, City of Malmo, that were given very high media attention, 
calling for a political reaction.” 
2MSELE 
The data of this study indicated that there was also disparity in prioritization of GEC, within 
individual member states. Dutch law enforcement and forensic respondents in The 
Netherlands suggested different prioritization between different geographic areas. 
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“So, you could imagine in Amsterdam the topic – illegal weapons – is on the agenda, but 
down in Holland, in Limburgh, near the Belgian border, it may not be a topic because there 
is not a problem. So that’s also making a difference in the choices nationwide.”  
1MNLLE 
This was supported by respondents from the UK: 
“We know that firearms isn’t on everyone else’s, kind of, top agenda because you’ve got the 
disparity between forces, between the like of West Midlands, Met, Merseyside, GMP, which 
are all kind of your gun crime forces, and then you’ve got ones like Northumberland where 
their gun crime is non-existent.”  
7FUKLE 
Disparity in resources and investigations 
During the interviews, participants described the impact of disparity in prioritisation, as 
having a direct effect on the resourcing and structure of policing and, therefore, on the 
investigation of GEC.  
“So when they have at certain moments a bit more staff, then you see they have a relative 
success. Then there are police operations where they are involved as well with the local 
police and certain gang are found and are taken away to prison and they find a whole range 
of weapons, and then we see what is the latest thing on the black market. But when the staff 
diminishes again, they can't do such actions.” 
3MBEP 
Within the UK separate forces historically had dedicated units who dealt with firearms 
crimes, which have since been disbanded.  
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 “But actually what’s happened is that lots of those forces have dedicated gun crime 
investigation capabilities. Because of austerity and because of reduction in shootings, that’s 
gone.”  
4MUKLE 
The practice of reducing firearms units was echoed in Holland and Denmark: 
 “This specialism was taken away, as we needed more people on the street. So it was not 
main topic anymore and we only do investigations if we find it, due to other criminal acts, 
activities.”  
1MNLLE 
 “But I think it's all about resources, that if we have some more resources to combatting it, 
that could be better; if we have resources and the priority for example making controlled visit 
at some of the weapon collectors  […] I think it's a lot about priority and resources.”  
3MDKLE 
As a consequence of reduced resources, the scope and focus of investigations into incidents 
of GEC was limited in identifying the source of the weapon used, as described by participants 
from the Netherlands: 
 “We do really the investigation on the gun itself in relation to other crimes, but the 
investigation to the person, where did he get it from? Where does it come from? Well, 
sometimes you do it and sometimes you don’t, because if you start this kind of investigation 
you cannot always see the end and if you cannot see the end of the effort it will take from you, 
as an organisation, we do not.”  
1MNLLE 
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A Belgian participant clearly showed the point that the source of the firearm is not a 
consideration in police investigations. 
“Firearms are often of secondary importance in police investigations. When you have a 
homicide case, first thing they look at is who did it, can you prove this person did it. Why did 
they do it? Was he there? It's logical. How the person got his weapon, whether it's firearms 
or something else, is usually secondary importance.”  
1MBER 
The lack of complete investigation suggests that in order to tackle GEC effectively two 
separate investigations need to be conducted focussing equally on perpetrator detection and 
wider issues of gun supply. For example, knowledge of the supply route for a firearm could 
assist to remove the armourer/supply and potentially reduce GEC. This also necessitates 
better knowledge of how the illicit gun market works and what factors impact on the demand 
for firearms. As some respondents stressed the reasons for an individual or groups of persons 
to demand firearms are complex and reflect cultural and social attitudes more than rational 
reasoning.  
South in the Ardennes, there is not much population there, they live in the forest, it's very 
nice, but they all think they have to have guns. Why? You never know! Society is dangerous, 
you can be robbed, and don't laugh, 60 years after, old people still say you never know if the 
bosch would come back... 
3MBeMIN 
In the UK, establishing the National Crime Agency (NCA) as central body that is responsible 
for collecting, analysing and disseminating information regarding firearm offences has 
proven to be beneficial in developing a national strategy to combat GEC. 
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“The national strategic assessment is an annual product. We then conduct a mid-year review 
in October, to see ‘right well how’s the response that we, as the NCA, have put in place has 
that changed the risk? Has it mitigated the risk?’ God forbid it's made it worse and we do 
that as a sort of constant review almost.” 
7UKFLE 
The role of the NCA as a focal point was identified by UK ballistic intelligence personnel as 
key to creating an accurate picture of the movement and use of firearms. 
“So, you get these regional differences but again we can only say that because it’s been 
identified by having that single point where everything is examined and the Intelligence is all 
brought together. […] So, whereas these things in the past might not get investigated because 
no one police force would see it as their problem and perhaps for whatever reason. […] It 
will now always be picked up and it might be picked up by the NCA.” 
3MUKB 
Interventions 
Respondents emphasised that the complex causes of GEC, necessitate a holistic approach 
addressing national as well as international social (e.g. education), economic (e.g. 
unemployment, housing) and cultural factors (e.g. gang and gun culture). 
 “Gun enabled crime is a small part of a wider approach and in fact your gun enabled crime 
actually becomes the symptom of what you should have been dealing with.”  
1MUKLE 
“It is important because we do not see from our side that it is a gun generated problem that it 
is the availability of firearms per se that causes the problem, but it’s the other way around.  
It’s these conflicts that create a larger demand for firearms.  So it’s the social context in 
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which these conflicts have arisen that also leads to an increase in firearms smuggling and 
usage.” 
2MSELE 
Therefore, preventative interventions, in which attention is exclusively paid to detecting and 
prosecuting firearm incidents, are at risk of remaining impaired in their effectiveness. Within 
the UK, communities are encouraged to be part of the intervention process. 
“Focus on the community and build spirit and strength in the community and if you can do 
that, you’ll actually start to reduce your gun and gang crime.”                                                                                                                                 
1MUKLE 
The need to engage the community is also an effective strategy across the breadth of Europe, 
for example in Eastern European countries, such as Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia: 
 “There is a comic book. [...] In the first stage of the campaign we used the message, the 
campaign’s name is ‘Less weapons less tragedies’ and the slogan was ‘Get the extruder out, 
make your home a safer place to live.”  
1MHRNGO 
 “We are working with OBSE for a longer period in the local communities and in the public 
schools with the children where we present to the children the hazards from use of weapons.”  
1MMKP 
It is not only a holistic approach to tackling the causes of GEC, but also identifying different 
statutory powers that can be used. In Denmark the use of powers relating to seizure of assets 
have been used effectively to help combat GEC. 
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“They use what they call the Al Capone method. It's, I think it's known all over the world to 
go and look where do your income come from? […] They did the same thing with the bikers 
and they took their motorbikes and expensive watches and cars and things from them and if 
they couldn’t document their income. The tax authorities actually have the, they’re allowed to 
search people’s homes, in a way that police are not allowed to.”  
1MDKB 
Within the UK a number of powers and agencies have been used in interventions. 
“So we have an, the Local Authority for example, has a whole raft of powers that we can use 
to tackle Serious Organised crime, and, you know, through licensing and trading 
standards...taxing, you know all these different aspects, but also through the other side of 
things, so through Adult Services, Troubled Families, Children’s Services, you know looking 
at the other aspects, the families that are involved in Serious Organised Crime.“  
2FUKNGO 
Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to scrutinize the policing of GEC in Europe. Like all research, this 
study has limitations and findings that have been reported here need to be treated with 
caution. Due to the voluntary nature of the research there was some variation in the range of 
perspectives that informed the study, and the number of informants from each country, which 
resulted in some limitations in terms of establishing a complete picture across the EU. In 
addition, most of the interviews were conducted in non-English speaking countries. Although 
all of the interviewees who agreed to be interviewed in English had sufficient command of 
the English language there is a range of epistemological and ontological issues that may arise 
(cf. Bogusia and Young, 2004). In particular, in interviews that had to be translated or 
conducted with the assistance of translators, the possibility of misrepresentation cannot be 
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completely ruled out. In an attempt to mediate these effects, interviewers who were native 
speakers were used when interviews had to be conducted in a language other than English, 
rendering the translator or interpreter as a less visible part of the research process (cf. Squires, 
2009). In one instance the assistance of an accredited translator was sought who was 
appointed by the stakeholder’s organisation.  
Despite these limitations, the use of qualitative data taken from interviews conducted across 
different countries within the EU has offered a unique insight into the social, economic and 
cultural challenges of combating GEC from a European perspective. Based on an economic 
model of gun crime, attention in previous research has predominantly been paid to the 
immediate effect of policy and legislative changes in relation to the complexity of GEC and 
to the role of police in dealing with GEC (e.g. Kleck, 2009; Sheptycki and Edwards, 2009).  
A key finding of this study is that investigations into incidents of GEC are characterised by 
competing pressures within police organisations. As a result ‘use of a firearm’ is often 
identified during police investigations as an aggravating factor to a primary offence rather 
than a primary offence in itself. This means that police enquiries into issues of supply are 
conducted incompletely or not undertaken at all.  
The impact of not identifying the source of a weapon is vital to combating GEC; failure to do 
so means that supply routes or ‘armourers’ are not identified, allowing further supply of 
firearms into the criminal world. Therefore, a shared legal definition of GEC might be helpful 
in changing the investigative mind-set of officers, to allow for a full and thorough 
investigation into the source of a weapon. This would allow intelligence on the illegal trading 
and trafficking of firearms to be gained and shared across member states, to better prevent 
other criminals arming themselves and potentially prevent future injury, death and damage 
(Diquet and van Alsten, 2015). 
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A further finding of this study has been the disparity in firearms legislations among EU 
member states regarding deactivation standards for firearms and access to gas and alarm 
weapons. Whilst these variations mirror cultural, economical and political tensions, the 
resulting legislative gaps have led to the emergence of a grey market where these guns can be 
traded across EU countries with varyingly stringent gun laws. The data of the present study 
indicate that in combination with EU trade treaties and growing online acquisitions of 
firearms, policing this grey market by the responsible authorities has become increasingly 
difficult. A particular threat to public safety appears to be posed by gas and alarm weapons 
which can be relatively easily converted into lethal firearms (SAS, 2015b).  
Ironically, the predominant use of converted and deactivated or antique guns by criminals can 
be seen as an indicator of the impact that coherently stringent legislation regarding lethal 
firearms has had. As access to such weapons has become increasingly difficult, converted 
guns, which cannot be traced and often provide a cheaper and more easily accessible 
alternative to original lethal firearms, have become particularly appealing to criminals. 
Equally, it demonstrates that legislation needs to be commonly shared throughout the EU. 
The newly amended EU firearms directive, which was introduced in April 2016, is certainly a 
promising step in the right direction by setting stricter conditions regarding the standards of 
deactivated guns and the circulation of such firearms; establishing common criteria 
concerning alarm weapons to prevent their transformation into fully functioning firearms; 
introducing tighter rules regarding online acquisition of firearms, including key gun parts and 
ammunition, through the internet; and imposing stricter conditions for collectors to limit the 
risk of sale to criminals (cf. European Commission 2015a).  
Hence, the new directive has the potential to improve policing regarding the three main 
components of the grey firearms market; deactivated, converted and antique weapons. 
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However, as no retrospective application is foreseen, the new directive will only apply to 
guns that will be deactivated in the future. Therefore, an opportunity has been missed to 
empower police to effectively tackle the potential risk that is currently posed by the vast 
amount of existing firearms that in the past have been deactivated to significantly varying 
standards. 
Furthermore, the changed legislation appears not to meet the more rigorous standards of some 
EU countries. For example, Sweden currently has probably the most stringent laws on 
deactivated and convertible weapons where such guns are included within the national 
firearms legislation. Therefore holders, of such firearms are subjected to similarly thorough 
assessments as if they held a firearm manufactured so it was capable of being shot. Such 
restrictions, however, were not included in the newly changed EU firearms direction.  
Both the original firearms directive 91/477/EEC and the amended directive 2008/51/EC 
failed to establish legislative coherency across the EU, as member states were allowed to 
impose more stringent rules, giving rise to the aforementioned grey firearms market. It 
appears, this conflict between different national firearms legislation will not be solved by the 
introduction of the new EU firearms directive and it therefore remains unclear to what extent 
true harmonization of policing the grey firearms market across the EU can be achieved.  
Another finding of this study was a disparity of prioritization of policing and combating GEC 
within and across EU countries. Within nation states, this disparity appeared to be mainly the 
result of fluctuations of GEC rates in various geographic regions. In contrast, the amount of 
resources dedicated to fighting GEC across the EU did not appear to be linked to the actual 
occurrence or prevalence of GEC, but did largely reflect the cultural and political awareness 
of gun violence. Prioritization and resourcing of combating GEC in most countries often 
appeared to be a ‘knee jerk’ reaction to an increase in GEC or a high profile incident such as 
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amuck shootings or terrorist attacks. In the short term, by allocating resources and being 
proactive it is possible to initially achieve significant success in these areas. Nonetheless, due 
to alternative priorities, complacency or budgetary constraints resources are often removed 
over time.  
Thus, a continued focus by politicians and police will not only help in maintaining a low 
national prevalence of GEC but also has the potential to allow for a more harmonized 
approach to GEC across EU member states. As the data of this study has shown, a disparity 
in prioritization of GEC across the EU does pose an obstacle to communication and free 
exchange of intelligence among government agencies from different EU member states, 
which ultimately undermines cross-national attempts to investigate and fight GEC more 
coherently.  
In this context, the new action plan by the European commission to implement the European 
Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015b) invites member states to set-up inter-
connected national focal points on firearms to develop and share expertise and improved 
analysis of GEC. In the UK, having a central firearms focal point such as the National Crime 
Agency (NCA), has been crucial in gathering and analysing information on GEC as well as 
strategically disseminating intelligence to politicians, constabularies and the general public. 
This has helped responsible authorities to coherently develop and maintain effective holistic 
approaches to combating GEC over time.  
Although the existence of the NCA has not completely prevented national disparities 
regarding the extent and nature of resources being allocated to fighting GEC, it has helped to 
harmonise police enquiries in their duration, intensity and focus. Hence, by providing a 
platform to better share information regarding prevalence and nature of GEC within and 
across EU member states, central firearms focal points will be essential in enabling 
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governments to develop national strategies on how to self-sufficiently yet coherently fight 
GEC across the EU.  
Throughout the interviews respondents highlighted the complex nature of the causes and 
motivations for perpetrators to be involved in GEC, which supports previous findings (Hales, 
Lewis and Silverstone, 2006; Robert and Innes, 2009; Squires, Grimshaw and Solomon 
2008). To some extent, this might help explaining the intra-national fluctuations of GEC 
reported by respondents. It does not really come as a surprise that in all western European 
states included in this research, a concentration of GEC was reported in metropolitan areas, 
which usually provide space for other crimes associated with GEC, particularly the dealing 
with illicit drugs.  
There is comprehensive evidence that illicit drug market activities and GEC are linked (e.g. 
Davis et al, 2001; Vaughn et al., 2016; Vaughn et al., 2014; Wintermute, 2015). However, 
crime organisations or individual actors who are involved in the illegal drug market are not 
always rational commercial entities like Thachuk and Saunders (2014) claim. Instead, both 
are influenced by a number of social and cultural structures in which they operate (May,1999; 
Lizotte, et al., 2000) and which impact on the way in which groups of individuals and society 
as a whole interpret and respond to conflicts (cf. Altenheimer and Boswell, 2012; Ayres, 
2009; Kahan, 2003). Confirming previous findings (e.g. Presdee, 2000), this study has 
demonstrated that the reasons why individuals acquire or possess firearms are complex and, 
at times, irrational.  
Law enforcement participants within the UK articulated the social conditions that can act as a 
route into GEC for young people, revealing that perpetrators do not always have a desire to 
be involved in such crimes, but utilise them as a means for social acceptance, social status 
and financial rewards, and show that GEC may be embedded in the culture of that person’s 
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life. This was echoed by respondents from Eastern European states where use of firearms by 
young people were reported in reference to conflicts that are inherent to the social 
environment in which they are raised.  
This ultimately means that in order to combat GEC effectively and sustainably, more 
attention has to be paid to the demand of illegal guns, which pose the biggest threat to public 
safety  Southwick, 1997; Stolzenberg and D’ lessio, 2000). In this context, a departure from 
an exclusive use of the economic model of GEC appears beneficial. This will allow for 
interventions that go beyond simply increasing the costs of illegal firearm use or possession 
(e.g. by introducing stricter legislation and harsher penalties).  
There is indeed comprehensive research indicating that strict legislation can have a 
decreasing impact on rates of GEC (e.g. Hales and Silverstone, 2005; Sherman, 2001; Taylor 
an Li, 2015). However, there is also evidence suggesting that the relation between legislation 
and GEC is not clear-cut (e.g. Kornblum, 1994). For example, similar laws often fail to have 
a similarly deterring effect in different geographic areas (cf. Piquero, 2007).  
Consequently, more studies such as those by Cooke and Puddifoot (2000) and Ropeik (2012) 
are needed, that scrutinise the symbolic function of guns in shaping identities (McLuhan and 
Zingrone, 1997). Only then, researchers and policy makers alike will develop a better 
understanding of the sometimes irrational dynamics of the black gun market (cf. Arsovska 
and Zabylelina, 2014; Florquin, 2014; Rigakos 2008), which in itself might lead to more 
sustainable responses to the illegal trafficking, dealing and use of firearms. In the past such 
specific target driven responses have been demonstrated to be successful, for example in the 
policing of gun violence related to illegal drug markets (Sevigny and Allen, 2015; Braga and 
Weisburd, 2012). 
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Hence, any action aiming to reduce GEC has to be holistic in its approach, to reflect the 
complex local causes of GEC itself and the routes that perpetrators take into this criminal 
world.  Equally, and as aforementioned, such actions should be sustainable, implying the 
need for long-term local interventions to change gang culture, and social causes of GEC. 
Multi-agency approaches involving education, local councils, social services and the police 
are better able to protect vulnerable people such as the under-aged.   
An example of good practice was given by a respondent from the UK, where law 
enforcement alone had limited impact on reducing the levels of GEC in a community 
notoriously associated with high levels of it. Consequently, a multi-agency approach, 
involving the community, was used to tackle a socially and financially deprived area, 
rejuvenating it, removing problem families and encouraging community strength. By doing 
so, this community was better able to make decisions about their own lives and work with 
different agencies to reduce the problem. In contrast, in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Croatia school children were very much directly targeted to tackle GEC. By 
working with communities, and gaining their trust and support, it was highlighted by 
participants that information and intelligence is more likely to be shared between 
communities and law enforcement agencies; which are key to successful prevention and 
investigation of GEC.  
Consequently, in order to address GEC more effectively both interventions and research need 
to equally focus on factors that compose it, including the regulation of deactivated weaponry 
as well as the motivations of those immediately involved in it, and factors that contextualise 
it, such as the social, economic and political environments which promote a particular 
concentration of GEC. On a political and investigative level this means to harness all 
available cross-national recourses in an attempt to overcome incompetence and conflicts over 
authority of knowledge.  
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Table 1 
Category Description Control  
A  Fully automatic weapons and military weapons;  
 explosive military missiles and launchers;  
 firearms disguised as other objects;  
 ammunition with penetrating, explosive or incendiary 
projectiles, and the projectiles for such ammunition 
 
Prohibited 
B  Firearms used by marksmen and hunters;  
 semi-automatic or repeating short firearms; 
 single-shot firearms with centre-fire percussion;  
 single shot short firearms with rimfire percussion 
whose overall length is less than 28cm;  
 Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and 
chamber can together hold more than three Rounds;  
 Semi-automatic long firearms whose magazine and 
chamber cannot together hold more than three 
 rounds, where the loading device is removable or 
where it is not certain that the weapon cannot 
 be converted, with ordinary tools, into a weapon whose 
magazine and chamber can together hold 
 more than three rounds;  
 Repeating and semi-automatic long firearms with 
smooth-bore barrels not exceeding 60 cm in length;  
 Semi-automatic firearms for civilian use which 
resemble' weapons with automatic mechanisms. 
 
Subject to authorisation 
C  Firearms used by hunters;  
 Repeating long firearms other than those listed in 
category B, point 6. 
 Long firearms with single-shot rifled barrels. 
 Semi-automatic long firearms other than those in 
category B, points 4 to 7. 
 Single-shot short firearms with rim fire percussion 
whose overall length is not less than 28 cm 
Subject to declaration 
D  Other firearms; 
 Single-shot long firearms with smooth-bore barrels.  
 Any essential component of such firearms : 
 The breach-closing mechanism, the chamber and the 
barrel of a firearm which, being separate objects, are 
included in the category of the firearms on which they 
are or are intended to be mounted. 
None 
Table 2 
Country Handguns Long Guns Air Guns Gas and alarm weapons 
FYR of 
Macedonia 
 License holders may own 
any number of hand guns 
 Minimum age 18 
 Firearms disguised as non-
weapons, silenced firearms, 
and armour piercing, 
explosive or incendiary 
ammunition are prohibited 
 Semi automatic guns with a 
magazine capacity of more 
than 3 rounds are prohibited 
 Registration required 
 No limitation of firepower or 
number of air guns 
 Gas-firing weapons are 
prohibited 
 signal weapons are subject to 
authorisation with a permit 
Croatia  No limitation of number or 
calibers of handguns for 
license holders  
 Minimum age 18 
 semiautomatic arms and 
repeating long-barreled 
firearms with a rifled barrel 
and magazine whose 
capacity is more than five 
rounds or with a fixed 
bayonet are prohibited 
 
 Firearms, gas and air 
weapons, with the bullet 
whose kinetic energy 
exceeds 7.5 joules and 
velocity exceeds 150 m/sec, 
may be acquired only 
subject to permit. 
 Gas-firing pistols requires only 
registration and not 
authorisation 
 Signal/Alarm pistols may be 
exempt from registration 
Portugal  License applicant has to be 
24 years old and has to 
submit 3 references 
 License has to be renewed 
every 4 years 
 Self defense not a reason 
for obtaining a license 
 Psychological assessment 
and police interview required 
 License has to be renewed 
every 5 years 
 Self defense not a reason for 
obtaining a license 
 License required 
 Minimum age 18 
 License applicant has to 
prove specific need, such as 
membership in a shooting 
club 
 License applicant has to 
submit a medical exam 
 License required 
 Minimum age 18 
 License applicant has to prove 
specific need 
 License applicant has to 
submit a medical exam 
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Spain  Minimum age 18 
 Only permitted for 
members of the general 
public for reasons of self-
defense 
 Minimum age 18 
 Number of guns owned 
unlimited 
 Magazine capacity restriction 
apply for center fire semi-
automatic rifles and 
shotguns  
 Semi-auto center-fire rifles 
are restricted to 4 cartridges 
and 2 cartridge capacity for 
hunting and 3 shells for 
semi-auto and pump action 
shotguns 
 Minimum age 18 
 Local permit required, which 
is only valid for 5 years in the 
granting municipality 
 Minimum age 18 
 Special permit required 
United 
Kingdom 
 Completely prohibited  Semi-automatic and pump-
action rifles are only 
permitted in .22 rimfire 
calibers and with a fixed 
magazine capacity of no 
more 3 (2 in magazine and 1 
in chamber)  
 Shotguns with detachable 
magazines  
 No license required 
 Air rifles with a projectile 
energy less than 16J and air 
pistols with a projectile 
energy less than under 8.1J 
can be purchased legally by 
anyone over the age of 18 
 Blank-firing and gas pistols 
are prohibited 
Netherlands  Minimum age 18 
 A license holder can only 
own 5 firearms 
 No restrictions on 
magazines or types of 
ammo 
 Minimum age 18 
 A license holder can only 
own 5 firearms 
 No restrictions on magazines 
or types of ammo 
 
 No license required 
 Minimum age 18 
 No restrictions on firepower 
 No license required 
 Minimum age 18 
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Denmark  Minimum age 18 
 Handgun licenses are only 
issued to people who have 
been an active member in 
a shooting club for 2 years 
 Licenses are valid for 2 
years 
 Minimum age 18 
 Only certain types of rifles 
shotguns are allowed (e.g. 
smooth-bore shotguns with a 
barrel length of at least 55 
cm, and a maximum caliber 
of 12 holding no more than 
two shot cartridges) 
 Licenses are valid for 5 
years for sport shooting and 
10 years for hunting 
 
 Minimum age 18 
 License required for all air 
guns 
 Valid for 10 years 
 Minimum age 18 
 License required for all gas 
and alarm weapons 
 Valid for 10 years 
Germany  Minimum age 18 
 License required 
 Number of hand guns 
limited to 2 
 Minimum age 18 
 Limited to 3 semi-automatic 
long guns 
 Pump-action shotguns with 
pistol grips or of a short 
overall length are prohibited 
 Minimum age 18 
 License required (small 
firearms carry permit) can be 
obtained without proving 
expert knowledge 
 Minimum age 18 
 License required (small 
firearms carry permit), can be 
obtained without proving 
expert knowledge 
Belgium  Minimum age 18 
 License required 
 Apart from automatic 
weapons license holders 
may own any number of 
handguns 
 Military weapons and their 
calibers are prohibited 
 High capacity cartridges 
are prohibited 
 Minimum age 18 
 Folding guns with a caliber 
>20 are prohibited 
 Military weapons and their 
calibers are prohibited 
 License holders may own 
any number of rifles 
 No restrictions regarding fire 
power 
 Freely available to persons 
at the age of 18 
 Freely available to persons at 
the age of 18 
France  Minimum age 18 
 License holders are 
allowed to own a maximum 
number of seven .22 
caliber handguns or five 
handguns of larger calibers 
 Minimum age 18 
 Psychological exam required 
 License holder must not 
have more than 12 firearms 
and no more than 50 rounds 
of ammunition 
 For air guns with a projectile 
energy less than 10J and 
more than 2J, no license is 
required 
 
 Freely available if firepower is 
less than 2J 
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Sweden  Minimum age 18 
 License applicant has to 
have been a member of a 
shooting club for at least 6 
months or passed a 
hunting exam 
 License holder can own 10 
hand guns 
 Minimum age 18 
 License applicant has to 
have been a member of a 
shooting club for at least 6 
months or passed a hunting 
exam 
 No hunting exam is 
necessary is chaperoned by 
someone who has passed a 
hunting exam 
 License holder can own 6 
hunting rifles 
 
 Firearms regulation does not 
apply to air guns with a 
projectile energy less than 
10 joules and can be bought 
by anyone at the age of 18 
 Firearms regulation does 
apply to gas and alarm 
weapons 
Italy  Minimum age 18 
 License holders my own up 
to three ‘common’ firearms 
(any firearm not using 
hunting calibers) 
 6 weapons classified as 
firearms for sport shooting 
 9 mm calibers hansguns 
are prohibited 
 ammunition is limited to 
200 rounds of handgun 
ammunition 
 if special requirements are 
met an additional, an 
additional 1500 rounds can 
be obtained 
 license holders my own an 
unlimited number of hunting 
weapons (includes 
shotguns) 
 unlimited single shot loader 
replicas for which no license 
is required 
 ammunition is limited to 
1500 rounds of hunting 
ammunition 
 
 For rifles and pistols with a 
projectile energy less than 
0.75 J no license is 
required 
 Currently available without 
license though it has been 
suggested by the Italian 
Senateto extend firearms 
legislation to also alarm and 
signal weapons, weapons of 
salute and acoustic weapons 
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Kosovo  Handguns are prohibited 
though licenses might be 
issued to individuals after 
proving a genuine need to 
possess a weapon for self-
defence  
 Semi-automatic or repeating 
short firearms require 
authorisation for acquisition 
 For rifles and pistols with a 
projectile energy less than 
0.75 J no license is required 
 gas-firing weapons are 
prohibited 
 firearms for light-acoustic 
signalization, including alarm 
pistols, may be purchased 
subject to a permit with 
additional conditions 
Serbia  License required 
 No restrictions on number 
or caliber 
 Semi-automatic assault 
weapons are prohibited, 
though license holders may 
own hunting approved semi-
automatic rifles 
 Firearms regulation does not 
apply to air guns with a 
projectile energy less than 
10 joules and can be bought 
by anyone at the age of 18 
 The procurement and 
possession of gas weapons 
 is prohibited; signal weapons 
require authorisation 
Table 3 
Country Gender  Stakeholder Interview 
type (group vs 
individual) 
Participant 
code 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
M x 2  
F x 2 
Policy 
Forensics 
Police 
Statistics 
Group 
 
1MMKP 
2FMKB 
3MMKLE 
4FMKSTAT 
Portugal M Forensics Individual 1MPTB 
Spain M Forensics Individual 1MESB 
United Kingdom M Police Individual 1MUKLE 
United Kingdom M Forensic Individual 3MUKB 
United Kingdom M Police Individual 4MUKLE 
United Kingdom F Police Individual 7FUKLE 
Holland M Police Individual 1MNLLE 
Holland M Forensic Individual 2MNLB 
Denmark M x 3 2 forensic 
1 Police 
Group 1MDKB 
2MDKB 
3MDKLE 
Germany M x 2 1 Police 
1 Forensic 
Group 1MFDB 
2MFDLE 
Belgium F Police Individual  2FBELE 
Belgium M Forensic Individual 4MBEB 
Belgium M Police Individual 6MBELE 
France M Forensic Individual 1MFRB 
Sweden M Police Individual 2MSELE 
Sweden M Forensic Individual 3MSEB 
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